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Estimating the Wage Elasticity of Labour Supply to a Firm: 
What Evidence Is There for Monopsony?
* 
 
In this paper we estimate the elasticity of the labour supply to a firm, using data from the 
Household, Income and Labour Dynamics in Australia (HILDA) Survey. Estimation of this 
elasticity is of particular interest not only in its own right but also because of its relevance to 
the debate about the competitiveness of labour markets. The essence of monopsonistically 
competitive labour markets is that labour supply to a firm is imperfectly elastic with respect to 
the wage rate. The intuition is that, where workers have heterogeneous preferences or face 
mobility costs, firms can offer lower wages without immediately losing their workforce. This is 
in contrast to the perfectly competitive extreme, in which the elasticity is infinite. Therefore a 
simple test of whether labour markets are perfectly or imperfectly competitive involves 
estimating the elasticity of the labour supply to a firm. We find that the Australian wage 
elasticity of labour supply to a firm is around 0.71, only slightly smaller than the figure of 0.75 
reported by Manning (2003) for the UK. These estimates are so far from the perfectly 
competitive assumption of an infinite elasticity that it would be difficult to make a case that 
labour markets are perfectly competitive. 
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I. Introduction 
Are labour markets competitive or are they characterised by frictions that essentially render 
them imperfectly competitive? This question can be addressed by estimating the elasticity of 
labour supply to a firm, as suggested by the dynamic monopsony framework. The essence of 
monopsonistically competitive or oligopsonistic labour markets is that labour supply to a firm is 
imperfectly elastic with respect to the wage rate. The intuition is that, where workers have 
heterogeneous  preferences  or  face  mobility  costs,  firms  can  offer  lower  wages  without 
immediately losing their workforce. This is in contrast to the perfectly competitive extreme, in 
which the elasticity is infinite. Monopsony theory suggests that the lower the ability of a worker 
to exploit outside options and move from job to job, the further will that worker’s wage be 
below  his  or  her  marginal  product,  and  the  greater  the  share  of  rents  that  employer  can 
appropriate from the worker. In short, labour markets frictions may generate a surplus that can 
be appropriated by wage-setting employers. To address this question, our paper estimates the 
elasticity of the labour supply to a firm. We do this using data from the first seven waves of the 
Household,  Income  and  Labour  Dynamics  in  Australia  (HILDA)  Survey,  a  panel  survey  that 
started in 2001. 
There are a number of reasons why labour markets might be frictional or imperfectly 
competitive.  Two  important  examples  include  heterogenous  preferences  for  non-wage 
characteristics of jobs (Bhaskar and To, 1999; Hamilton, Thisse and Zenou, 2000) or search 
frictions (Albrecht and Axell, 1984; Burdett and Mortensen, 1998; Manning, 2003). According to 
Bhaskar and To (1999), workers have idiosyncratic preferences over employment at different 
firms, and these preferences are private information. Thus a firm's wage offer depends on how 2 
 
much  he  or  she  believes  the  employee  prefers  working  there,  rather  than  elsewhere.  To 
support this argument, Bhaskar and To (1999) cite various empirical studies. They then show 
that equilibrium implies a firm offers a wage below marginal product, where the firm's trade-off 
is between offering an even lower wage and an increased probability that the worker chooses 
to work elsewhere (see also Bhaskar, Manning and To, 2002).
  The dynamic monopsony models 
produce related predictions. It is these predictions that we investigate in the remainder of the 
paper.  
To foreshadow our main results, we find that the Australian wage elasticity of labour 
supply to a firm is around 0.71. This is only slightly smaller than the figure of 0.75 reported for 
the UK. In contrast, the elasticity of labour supply for the US is found by Manning (2003) to be 
1.38  using  the  Panel  Study  of  Income  Dynamics  (PSID)  data  and  0.68  using  the  National 
Longitudinal Survey of Youth (NLSY) data. All these estimates are so far from the perfectly 
competitive assumption of an infinite elasticity that it would be difficult to make a case that 
labour markets are perfectly competitive. 
The next section of the paper outlines the model and methodology, while Section III 
describes the data. Section IV presents estimates of the separation elasticity and Section V gives 
the  implied  elasticity  of  labour  supply  to  a  firm.  A  comparison  is  also  made  between  our 
estimates and those obtained by Manning (2003) using comparable data for the US and the UK. 
Since the HILDA Survey used in our analysis is very similar in structure to the British Household 
Panel Survey (BHPS) and to the US Panel Study of Income Dynamics (PSID), this comparison is 
particularly  relevant.  Section  VI  discusses  gender  differences  in  the  wage  elasticity  of 3 
 
separations and compares the Australian estimates with those found in the US and the UK. The 
final section concludes.  
 
II. Methodology 
In  deriving  empirical  predictions  from  a  dynamic  monopsony  model  based  on  Burdett  and 
Mortensen  (1998),  we  closely  follow  Manning  (2003:  Chapter  4).  Denote  separation  and 
recruitment rates respectively by: 
 
     
        
  
w
u dx x N x f R w R
w F w s

  1
        (1) 
Here    w s  is the separation rate from a firm that pays wage  w ,   is the exogenous rate at 
which workers leave employment for non-employment, and   is the arrival rate of job offers 
from the distribution of wage offers   w F .  The flow of recruits to the firm is denoted by    w R , 
while
u R  represents recruits from non-employment and    w N  is the firm’s employment level. 
In  steady  state  the  total  number  of  separations  is  equal  to  the  number  of  recruits.  Our 




Differentiation with respect to  w  of each of the pair of  equations above, and use of the steady 
state condition that        w R w N w s  , yields the following 4 
 
Rw sw                 (2) 
which states that the separation elasticity εsw equals the negative of the recruitment elasticity 
εRw. Rearrangement of the steady state condition yields N(w)=R(w)/s(w). After taking logs of 
this, simplifying, and using (2), one obtains the following expression for the elasticity of labour 
supply εNw 
sw sw Rw Nw     2             (3) 
Thus  estimating  the  separation  elasticity  and  doubling  it  will  provide  an  estimate  of  the 




We now relax the assumption that separations to and recruitment from non-employment are 
not sensitive to the wage and calculate the elasticity of labour supply as a weighted average: 








Rw R Nw                1 1   (4) 
where 
e
sw   and 
n
sw   are the separation rates to employment and non-employment, 
e
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n
Rw   
are  the  recruitment  rates  from  employment  and  non-employment,  S    is  the  share  of 


















            (5) 
Thus, (4) becomes: 
                                                 
2 Note that our equation (3) is equivalent to (4.14) in Manning (2003), while our equation (4) below is equivalent to 
Manning’s (4.18). 5 
 




sw R Nw          1 2 2         (6) 
 




Our  data are from waves 1 to 7 of the Household, Income and Labour Dynamics in 
Australia (HILDA) Survey. The HILDA Survey distinguishes between employment-related and 
personal reasons why a respondent stopped work in the last job, with detailed reasons given in 
each category. It is therefore possible to differentiate between transitions that are job-to-job and 
those that are job to non-employment.
3  
The Household, Income and Labour Dynamics in Australia (HILDA) Survey is a nationally 
representative random-sample panel survey of private households in Australia.  All members of 
households providing at least one interview in wave 1 formed the basis of the panel followed in 
each subsequent wave. The sample has been gradually extended to include new household 
members resulting from changes in the composition of the original households. The HILDA 
survey data have been collected annually in a standardised format since 2001.
4 This dataset has 
several advantages for our purposes. First, it is a remarkably rich source of information on 
education and other relevant attributes including demographics. Clearly the richer the set of 
                                                 
3 The data also distinguish between annual job-to-job transitions that are voluntary or involuntary.  
4 Wave 1 included 13,969 respondents aged 15 and older distributed across 7682 households.  Further details of 
the survey are provided in Watson (2008) and Wooden and Watson (2007). 6 
 
controls, the lower is unobserved heterogeneity. Second, the data trace the same individuals 
over time, allowing us to measure job separations and where the worker went after separation.  
We applied the following restrictions to the data to generate a sample of individuals 
who were: (i) present in two or more adjacent waves; (ii) in continuing employment (not in self-
employment or on a casual or fixed-term contract) at the first of each pair of waves; and (iii) 
receiving an hourly real wage w in the range 1<w<100.
5  In addition, we dropped all pairs of 
waves in which the individual was younger than 25 or older than 55 in the second wave of the 
wave-pair.
6 We also restricted the subsample to exclude workers who are in the armed forces, 
reporting over 100 working hours per week (hours are used to derive hourly wages), and full-
time students. After applying these restrictions, we obtained an estimating sample comprising 
14,887 person-year observations, of which 8,106 are male and 6,781 female. Table A.1 in the 
Data Appendix provides details of restrictions that were applied to the data in order to obtain 
our estimating sample and the number of cases lost as each restriction was applied.  
Table 1 presents summary statistics for the principal variables of interest. To calculate 
separations,  we  used  our  sample  of  pairs  of  waves  containing  individuals  in  continuous 
employment at time t, and then we checked where they were at time t+1. The first row displays 
the mean yearly job-separation rates for all forms of separation.
7 The first column shows this 
was 0.139 for the combined sample of men and women. That is, on average every year around 
                                                 
5 The hourly wage rate is that which is paid in the main job.  To calculate this, we used the HILDA derived variables 
for the current weekly gross wages and salary for the main job, and for hours worked per week in the main job 
during the survey week (for more details, see Watson, 2008). We deflated wages to 2001 (wave 1) levels using the 
headline Consumer Price Index (CPI) from the Australian Bureau of Statistics.  
6 For example, if a person was 55 years old in wave 2, then the pair wave1 and wave2 would be included but not 
the subsequent ones (wave2 and wave3), and so on. 
7 The data obtains detailed information only on annual transitions, although it does ask for the number of jobs 
between waves. Since less than 2% of our sample engaged in more than one transition between waves, we expect 
the biases in our estimates to be small. 7 
 
13.9% of the sample of all workers in continuing jobs left that job for either another job or for 
non-employment. Next we disaggregate by gender. For men, the separation rate is 0.133 and 
for women it is slightly higher at 0.144. The second and third rows look at separations to 
employment and non-employment respectively. We now see that the average separation rate 
each year to employment was 10.7%. The male rate is slightly higher at 11.4% than the female 
of 9.7%. Separations to non-employment are much lower, being 3.2% for men and women 
combined. When this is disaggregated by gender, each year just 1.9% of men move into non-
employment as compared with 4.7% of women. The difference between the male and female 
mean separations is presented in the last column. In all cases, the difference between these 
two means is statistically significant at the 5 percent level at least. Lastly, note that, conditional 
on job separation, around 0.77 of cases went to another job while the remainder went to non-
employment. For women, the exit rate into another job is proportionately smaller (at 0.674) 
than for men, for whom it is 0.857.  
[Insert Table 1 near here] 
It is interesting that these job-separation rates from the HILDA Survey data are lower 
than those found in both the USA and the UK (see Manning, 2003). While the mean separation 
rate in Australia is just under 14%, in Britain it is 19% and in the US it is 21%.  
Table 1 also displays means of some other relevant variables. For our sample of all 
employees in continuing jobs, the hourly wage rate in 2001 values was A$21.23, while for men 
it was A$22.54 and for women A$19.65. These raw wage data indicate that Australian women 
in continuing jobs are earning around 87% of the male wage on average. The women in our 
sample are a few months older than the men, but they have just over two years less labour 8 
 
market experience and their job tenure is shorter by over one year. Finally, note from the last 
panel of Table 1 that each pair of years represents around the same proportion of the sample, 
at between 16% and 17%. 
 
IV. Estimating the wage elasticity of separation 
The instantaneous job separation rate is given as s=e 
βx , where Xi is a vector of individual and 
firm characteristics, the associated parameter vector is given by , and ln wi is the natural 
logarithm of the real (2003 prices) hourly wage of individual  i at time t . Since the natural 
logarithm  of  the  wage  rate  is  included  as  an  explanatory  variable,  the  elasticity  of  the 
separation rate with respect to the wage is simply the coefficient to the wage.  
To obtain the wage elasticity of separation, we estimate logit models of the probability 
of separating from a continuing job. Thus the dependent variable measures job terminations or 
separations from continuing employment in year t to either another job or to nonwork in year 
t+1.  
Assume that the two types of separation conditional on X are independent. Given this, it 
is  straightforward  to  show  that  separations  to  another  job  or  to  non-employment  can  be 
estimated  separately,  and  that  is  what  we  do  in  this  paper.
8  To estimate the ela sticity of 
separation  to another job, we use our sample of individuals who have been in continuous 
employment at time t and the dependent variable is an indicator taking the value of one if the 
person leaves to another job at time t+1 and zero otherwise.. To estimate the elasticity of 
                                                 
8 See Manning (2003: page 101) for a detailed exposition. This is analogous to estimation in a competing risks 
framework. 9 
 
separation to non-employment, we use the sample of individuals who have been in continuous 
employment at time t and the dependent variable is an indicator variable taking the value of 
one  if  the  person  leaves  to  non-employment  at  time  t+1  and  zero  otherwise.  For  each 
subsample, we compute, from the estimated coefficient to the log wages, the wage elasticity 
calculated at the sample mean of the explanatory variables.  
The  combined  elasticity  is  the  weighted  average  of  these  two  elasticities,  with  the 
weight given by the fraction of separations into non-employment.
9 This is Method 2 described 
in Section II above. 
We estimate separation elasticities for three separate subsamples of data: men only, 
women only, and the combined sample of men and women, all as shown in Table 2.  For each 
estimating sample we estimate three separate specifications: (i) without controls;  (ii) with 
controls excluding job tenure; and (iii) with all controls including job tenure.  First consider the 
estimates of the separation elasticity calculated for  any exit (either to another job or to non-
employment),  and presented  in  Panel  A  of  Table  2.  For  the  combined  sample  of  men  and 
women (see the third column), and from the first specification with no controls, the elasticity is 
found to be -0.425. Once we incorporate controls (including the usual human capital measures 
but  not  job  tenure),  the  elasticity  drops  to  -0.361.  A  one  percent  fall  in  the  wage  rate  is 
associated  with  an  increase  in  job  separations  of  around  one  third of  one percent, ceteris 
paribus.
10 Although there are good arguments for excluding tenure from the estimation, we 
                                                 
9 We also estimated all our models using probit regression, producing broadly similar elasticities to those reported 
here. Ransom and Oaxaca (2005) discuss in some detail methods of imputing the elasticity. We use the method 
they label as Method A.  
 
10 Controls are gender, age, experience, experience squared, number of children, and dummies for health status, 
non-English speaking background, marriage or cohabitation, highest educational qualification, state and urban. We 10 
 
present - in the last row of Panel A of Table 2 - the separation elasticity from a specification 
with tenure included.
 11 The elasticity almost halves, now becoming only -0.211.
12  
[Insert Table 2 near here] 
Next consider the estimates of the separation elasticity for   the  separate  male  and 
female subsamples, calculated for any exit, and presented in the first two columns of Panel A. 
The second row of estimates, our preferred specification, shows the wage elasticity of job 
separation to be -0.389 for men and -0.31 for women.  
Now  turn  to  the  disaggregated  separation  elasticities  to  another  job  and  to  non-
employment respectively, shown in Panels B and C of Table 2. These reveal that women are 
more sensitive to wages when shifting to another job than are men, but that men are more 
sensitive  when  shifting  to  non-employment.  The  finding  that  the  female  wage  elasticity  of 
separation is not significantly different from zero is striking, suggesting as it does that Australian 
women are making decisions to leave a continuing job entirely on nonwage considerations. 
However, Australian men are not.   
That there is not a larger increase in separations in response to lower wages suggests 
that other factors are keeping workers at the firm, factors that we have not been able to 
control for in spite of our excellent data. Of course this is in accord with the assumptions of 
                                                                                                                                                             
also experimented with including wave and part-time dummies, but our estimates are not significantly affected by 
their inclusion. 
11  As  job  tenure  and  wages  are  positively  correlated  with  one  another  and  negatively  correlated  with  job 
separations, the inclusion of job tenure will reduce the wage elasticity. In that case, why include it at all? As noted 
by Manning (2003), one might want to capture the possibility that higher wages affect separations both directly 
and indirectly through job tenure. But on the other hand, if there are seniority wage scales whereby workers 
advance automatically up the wage scale as the job-years roll by, an apparent relationship between separations 
and  wages  may  be  spurious.  The  inclusion  of  tenure  captures  this  seniority-scale  effect  and  hence  spurious 
correlation of wages and employment will be removed. 
12 Tenure and tenure squared are significant in all regressions (negative and positive respectively). As expected, the 
inclusion of job tenure always considerably reduces the estimated wage elasticity. 11 
 
much of the ‘new monopsony’ theory - that there are labour market frictions, search costs and 
non-pecuniary factors keeping workers in a job and consequently allowing the employer to 
extract some rents. For example, as noted in the Introduction, Bhaskar and To (1999) assume 
workers  have  idiosyncratic  preferences  over  employment  at  different  firms,  and  those 
preferences are private information. Thus a firm’s wage offer depends on how much he/she 
believes the employee prefers working there rather than elsewhere. Bhaskar and To (1999) cite 
various  empirical  studies  supporting  the  assumption  that  workers  have  heterogeneous 
preferences  for  non-wage  characteristics.  Bhaskar  et  al.  (2002)  further  note  that  this 
assumption can usefully summarise the variety of reasons for imperfect competition in the 
labour market. Specifically, equilibrium implies a firm offers a wage below marginal product, 
where the firm’s trade-off is between offering an even lower wage and an increased probability 
that the worker chooses to work elsewhere.
  
Using these elasticities of separation with respect to the wage rate, we can now impute 
the wage-elasticity of labour supply to the firm using Methods 1 and 2. The results of this 
exercise are presented in the following section.  
 
V. Estimating the wage elasticity of labour supply to the firm 
To obtain the wage elasticity of the labour supply the firm faces, we use equation (3) and (6) 
above (Methods 1 and 2 respectively). Method 1 states that the negative of the elasticity of the 
labour supply is given by twice the elasticity of the steady state separation rate with respect to 
the wage. These results are given in Panel B of Table 3.  
[Insert Table 3 near here] 12 
 
Our preferred estimates are those calculated with Method 2 and given in Panel F at the bottom 
of the table. These utilise the disaggregated separation elasticities to another job or to non-
employment, which are then weighted by their shares to construct the wage elasticity of the 
labour supply. For the specification which includes all the controls except job tenure, the wage 
elasticity of labour supply is 0.709 for the combined sample, and is 0.76 for men and 0.61 for 
women.
13 
[Insert Table 4 near here] 
Our estimates from Australian data are only slightly smaller than those reported for the 
UK by Manning (2003: Table 4.10). Manning finds an elasticity of labour supply of 0.75 using 
both the British Household Panel Survey (BHPS) and the  UK Labour Force Surveys (LFS), while 
ours is 0.71. In contrast, his reported elasticity of labour supply for the US is 1.38 using  the 
Panel Study of Income Dynamics (PSID) data and 0.68 using the National Longitudinal Survey of 
Youth (NLSY) data. Table 4 reports this comparison.  
 
VI. Sensitivity analysis: Fixed effects logit estimates 
So far we have utilized the panel structure of the data only to identify transitions. We did this to 
be  able  to  compare  our  estimates  with  those  obtained  by  Manning  (2003)  using  a  similar 
methodology.  However,  to  cater  for  unobserved  heterogeneity  that  may  lead  to  biased 
coefficients (if some individuals are innately more likely to change jobs) we also estimated a 
                                                 
13 Such gender differences are consistent with other studies, although the magnitude differs. For example, Ransom 
and Oaxaca (2005), using US data from a chain of grocery stores, estimate elasticities of labour supply to the firm 
of around 2.7 for men and 1.5 for women. Barth and Dale-Olsen (2009) investigate the evidence for monopsonistic 
discrimination by gender, using linked employer-employee data for Norway. Their results suggest that a proportion 
of the gender gap might be attributable to gender differences in labour market frictions. They find elasticities of 
between 0.8 and 1.7 for different groups. 13 
 
fixed-effects  logit  model.  This  allows  for  correlation  between  the  individual  effect  and  the 
regressors.  
Estimation of the fixed effects or conditional logit model requires that individuals are 
present in at least two sets of wave-pairs, which necessarily reduces the sample size. Almost 
half the sample is present in only one or two pairs of waves. Obviously those individuals present 
in only one pair (about one quarter of the sample) will be dropped from the conditional logit 
subsample.
14 Thus our estimating subsample comprises 3624 individuals (1925 men and 1699  
women) who are present in the data for between two and six pairs of waves. 
The results from this conditional logit model are presented in Table 5. After controlling 
for fixed effects,  we find that separation   rates are no longer sensitive to the wage   rate. 
Whether this is an artifact of our particulat dataset remains to be seen, as so far there has been 
little research in the separations literature relying on fixed effects estimation. 
[Insert Table 5 near here] 
However, our findings that separations are not  significantly increased in response to lower 
wages do suggest that other factors may be keeping workers at the firm.  This accords with the 
assumptions of much of the ‘new monopsony’ theory, namely that labour market frictions, 
search costs and non-pecuniary factors contribute to worker retention and consequently allow 
the employer to extract some rents. 
 
VII. A cross-country comparison of separation elasticities by gender 
                                                 
14  There  is  considerable  job  stability  across  waves  for  the  HILDA  data.  Australian  workers  in  continuing 
employment do, like their British counterparts leave their jobs relatively infrequently compared with those in a 
country like the US (see Booth, Francesconi and Garcia-Serrano, 1999). 
 14 
 
We now briefly compare our separation elasticities obtained using the HILDA Survey data with 
those found by Manning (2003: Table 7.7) for the UK and the US, focusing on the gender 
differences. This is a particularly relevant comparison, as Manning also uses representative 
survey-based panel data. These elasticities are summarized in Table 6, with standard errors 
given in parentheses. Notice that including controls in the HILDA data reduces the estimated 
wage elasticity in almost all cases but by a smaller extent than BHPS. 
[Insert Table 6 near here] 
For the sample of men and women pooled, the elasticities for both separations to employment 
and non-employment are sensitive to the wage. However, contrary to the BHPS estimates, we 
find with HILDA that the latter is smaller than the former. Moreover, even though our estimates 
from the samples with men and women pooled are remarkably similar, as Table 4 indicated, 
there are some striking gender differences when we disaggregate by gender.  
First,  comparing  the  BHPS  and  HILDA  estimates,  we  see  that  the  British  female 
separation elasticities to other jobs are smaller than the male in absolute terms. While we 
expected the absolute value of the male elasticity to be greater than the female for separations 
to other jobs, this was not found with the HILDA data. However the difference is not large.  
Second,  according  to  the  BHPS,  male  and  female  separation  elasticities  to  non-
employment are not so very different, although they are smaller in absolute terms for women 
than  for  men.  However  the  HILDA  estimates  find  a  big difference.  Indeed, the  HILDA data 
suggest that, while the male elasticities of separation to non-employment are not so different 
to those from the BHPS, the HILDA female wage elasticities of separation to non-employment 
are close to zero.  Indeed, as noted in Section IV, Australian women appear to make decisions 15 
 
to leave a continuing job entirely on nonwage considerations, whereas men do not.  We hope 
to explore these gender comparisons further in our future research.  
 
VIII. Conclusions 
Are labour markets competitive or are they characterised by frictions that essentially render 
them imperfectly competitive? We addressed this question through estimation of the elasticity 
of labour supply to a firm, using the Household, Income and Labour Dynamics in Australia 
(HILDA)  Survey,  a  panel  survey  with  rich  information  about  worker  turnover  as  well  as 
individual and firm-level attributes.  
The essence of monopsonistically competitive or oligopsonistic labour markets is that 
labour supply to a firm is imperfectly elastic with respect to the wage rate. The intuition is that, 
where workers have heterogeneous preferences or face mobility costs, firms can offer lower 
wages  without  immediately  losing  their  workforce.  This  is  in  contrast  to  the  perfectly 
competitive extreme, in which the elasticity is infinite.  Therefore a simple test of whether 
labour markets are perfectly or imperfectly competitive involves estimating the wage elasticity 
of the labour supply to a firm.  We found that the Australian wage elasticity of labour supply is 
around 0.71, only slightly smaller than the figure of 0.75 reported by Manning (2003) for the 
UK. 
While in an ideal world one would prefer to estimate the wage elasticity of the labour 
supply to a firm using data from a natural experiment in which there is an exogenous change in 
an  individual  firm’s  wages,  such  data  are  extremely  rare.  Our  estimates  for  Australia,  in 
common  with  those  from  earlier  research  using  the  same  modeling  strategy,  may  well  be 16 
 
downward-biased for the reasons detailed in Manning (2003). However, these estimates are so 
far from the perfectly competitive prediction of an infinite elasticity that it would be difficult to 
make  a  case  that  labour  markets  are  perfectly  competitive.  It  is  interesting  that  a  parallel 
stream of the labour economics literature, focusing on employer-provided training and the 
conditions under which firms will finance it, has reached a similar conclusion.
15  
 
   
                                                 
15  For overviews, see Acemoglu and Pischke (1999) and more recently Booth and Bryan (2005). 17 
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  All  Males  Females  Difference 
(M-F)    Mean  St Dev  Mean  St Dev  Mean  St Dev 
 
Separations 





















































             
Age  40.20  8.42  40.04  8.32  40.40  8.53  -0.36*** 
Experience  20.34  9.13  21.32  9.37  19.16  8.69  2.16*** 
Tenure  7.64  7.61  8.18  8.12  6.98  6.89  1.2*** 
 
Sample 
             
Sample size  14,887    8,106    6,781     
Fraction of 
sample from 
each pair of 
years: 
             
2001-2  0.169    0.173    0.165     
2002-3  0.167    0.167    0.167     
2003-4  0.168    0.169    0.168     
2004-5  0.166    0.167    0.164     
2005-6  0.164    0.162    0.166     
2006-7  0.166    0.162    0.17     
 
Notes: (1) Asterisks denote level of significance of a mean comparison t-test: *10%, **5%, ***1%. 19 
 
 





   
  Males  Females  All 
 
A. All separations 
 







No controls  -0.435***(0.066)  -0.41***(0.081)  -0.425***(0.051) 
With controls  -0.389***(0.077)  -0.31***(0.097)  -0.361***(0.06) 
Tenure controls  -0.245***(0.081)  -0.151 (0.102)  -0.211***(0.063) 
 
B. Separations to employment 
 







No controls  -0.383***(0.072)  -0.515***(0.099)  -0.43***(0.059) 
With controls  -0.345***(0.085)  -0.449***(0.119)  -0.376***(0.068) 
Tenure controls  -0.187** (0.09)  -0.265**(0.126)  -0.204***(0.073) 
 
C. Separations to non-employment 
 







No controls  -0.685***(0.167)  -0.18(0.149)  -0.399***(0.114) 
With controls  -0.591***(0.194)  -0.008 (0.181)  -0.282**(0.134) 










Notes:  (1)  Asterisks  denote  level  of  significance:  *10%,  **5%,  ***1%.  (2)  Standard  errors  in 
parenthesis. (3) The rows headed ‘no controls’ only include the wage reported in the previous wave 
and a female dummy for the pooled regressions. The rows marked ‘with controls’ include health, 
urban, education, marital status, children, region, experience, experience squared, age bands, non-
english speaking background, and a female dummy for the pooled regressions. The rows headed 
‘tenure controls’ include tenure and tenure squared. 20 
 
Table 3: The Elasticity of the Labour Supply Curve, HILDA Survey 
 
  Males 
 
Females  All 
       
A. Elasticity of separations (All)       
No controls  -0.435  -0.41  -0.425 
With controls  -0.389  -0.31  -0.361 
With controls including tenure  -0.245  -0.151  -0.211 
       
B.  Elasticity of labour supply (Method 1)       
No controls  0.87  0.82  0.85 
With controls  0.778  0.62  0.722 
With controls including tenure  0.490  0.302  0.422 
       
 
C. Elasticity of separations to employment (Table 2B) 
     
No controls  -0.383  -0.515  -0.43 
With controls  -0.345  -0.449  -0.376 
With controls including tenure  -0.187  -0.265  -0.204 
       
D. Elasticity of separations to non-employment (Table 2C)       
No controls  -0.685  -0.18  -0.399 
With controls  -0.591  -0.008  -0.282 
With controls including tenure  -0.492  -0.079  -0.207 
       
E. Share of separations that are to employment  0.857  0.674  0.770 
       
F. Elasticity of labour supply (Method 2)       
No controls  0.852  0.812  0.846 
With controls  0.76  0.61  0.709 
With controls including tenure  0.461  0.409  0.409 
       
Notes: (i) Method 1 uses the elasticity of all separations to estimate the elasticity of the labour supply curve to a 
firm, while Method 2 utilises the disaggregated separations to another job or to non-employment and the two 
elasticities are weighted by their shares to construct the elasticity of the labour supply.  (ii) Controls are listed at 




Table 4: Separation and Labour Suppy Elasticities: Comparing Australia with Britain and the US. 
 
             USA             UK  Australia 
Dataset 
 
PSID  NLSY  BHPS  LFS  HILDA 
Elasticity of separations to employment  0.867  0.359  0.631  0.529  0.376 
Elasticity of separations to non-employment  0.892  0.85  0.632  0.578  0.282 
Share of  separations to employment  0.620  0.78  0.63  0.56  0.77 
Elasticity of labour supply curve 
 
1.38  0.68  0.75  0.75  0.709 
Notes: (i) The HILDA estimates taken from our Tables 2 and 3, and the other estimates from Manning (2003) Table 
4.10. (ii) We have omitted the negative from our separation elasticities for ease of comparison. 
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  Males  Females  All 
 
A. All separations 
 







No controls  -0.166 (0.166)  0.057 (0.069)  -0.045 (0.094) 
With controls  -0.207 (0.221)  -0.207 (0.221)  -0.047 (0.057) 
Tenure controls  -0.042 (0.07)  -0.001 (0.002)  -0.008 (0.011) 
 
B. Separations to employment 
 







No controls  -0.218 (0.188)  -0.268 (0.259)  -0.236 (0.152) 
With controls  -0.318 (0.235)  -0.279 (3.61)  -0.295 (0.182) 
Tenure controls  -0.114 (0.168)  -0.047 (1.97)  -0.085 (0.104) 
 
C. Separations to non-employment 
 







No controls  0.073 (0.114)  0.023 (0.024)  0.055 (0.035) 
With controls  Not enough observations  
to compute these  Tenure controls 
 
Notes:  (1)  Asterisks  denote  level  of  significance:  *10%,  **5%,  ***1%.  (2)  Standard  errors  in 
parenthesis. (3) The rows headed ‘no controls’ only include the wage reported in the previous wave 
and a female dummy for the pooled regressions. The rows marked ‘with controls’ include health, 
urban, education, marital status, children, region, experience, experience squared, age bands, non-
english speaking background, and a female dummy for the pooled regressions. The rows headed 
‘tenure controls’ include tenure and tenure squared. 23 
 
Table 6: Separation and Labour Suppy Elasticities: Comparing Australia with Britain and the US. 
 
  Males  Females  All 
  HILDA  BHPS  PSID  HILDA  BHPS  PSID  HILDA  BHPS  PSID 

















































No inf.  No inf.  -0.151 
(0.102) 























































No inf.  No inf.  -0.265 
(0.126) 























































No inf.  No inf.  -0.079 
(0.183) 







Note: No inf. stands for no information. The BHPS and PSID estimates were obtained from Manning (2003). 
 
 
 
 
 
 